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Abstract  
Moksha Patam is a game associated with traditional Hindu philosophy that was later marketed 
in England as "Ladders and Snakes". 
The evolution of Brazil in the last twenty years, especially its trajectory as an "emerging 
power", can be analysed taking into consideration this ancient Indian game. Indeed, during 
the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil enjoyed a great political and economic bonanza. 
In its actions, both nationally and internationally, only the "ladders" seemed to prevail, which 
drove domestic economic growth, increased the social welfare of the lower and middle classes 
and promoted the country's international emergence. 
However, in the beginning of the second decade of the new century, and in the wake of the 
2008 crisis, the international game as a whole began to suffer complications. This systemic 
variable quickly combined with growing internal problems that dragged Brazil towards multiple 
"snakes" that plunged the country into economic recession, the reprimarization of the 
economy and corruption. In this context, it is then necessary to pose the question: what are 
the ladders that the Brazilian government succeeded to climb and stay in that position? What 
factors can explain the recent and increasingly frequent snakes Brazil is entrapped in? From 
a theoretical point of view, the discussion presented here is framed, in a broad sense, in the 
debates related to the rise and fall of powers in the international structure. To what extent do 
the internal and external factors that explain the future of a given State condition its position 
in the global framework? Taking into account the case of Brazil: what are the consequences - 
both regarding its achievements and its recent troubles – for its international path? 
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1. Introduction  
Moksha Patam is a game associated with traditional Hindu philosophy that was later 
marketed in England as "Ladders and Snakes". Based on its origins, the game 
emphasized two concepts: "karma" and "kama", or destiny and desire. In other words, 
the game was used to teach the consequences of good deeds as opposed to bad ones. 
Accordingly, while the "ladders" represented virtues such as generosity, faith and 
humility, the "snakes" represented vices such as lust, anger, murder, and theft. 
The evolution of Brazil in the last twenty years, especially its trajectory as an "emerging 
power", can be analysed taking into consideration this ancient Indian game. 
Indeed, during the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil enjoyed a great political and 
economic bonanza. In its actions, both nationally and internationally, only the "ladders" 
seemed to prevail, which drove domestic economic growth, increased the social welfare 
of the lower and middle classes and promoted the country's international emergence. 
However, at the beginning of the second decade of the new century, and in the wake of 
the 2008 crisis, the international game as a whole began to suffer complications. In this 
sense, Brazil was able to stay out of these new difficulties only for a short period of time. 
This systemic variable quickly combined with growing internal problems that dragged 
Brazil towards multiple "snakes" that plunged the country into economic recession, the 
reprimarization of the economy and corruption. 
In this context it is then necessary to pose the question: What are the ladders that the 
Brazilian government succeeded to climb and stay in that position? What factors can 
explain the recent and increasingly frequent snakes Brazil is entrapped in? 
From a theoretical point of view, the discussion is framed, in a broad sense, in the debates 
related to the rise and fall of powers in the international structure and the consequent 
rearrangements of global power. From this perspective, the classic analyses carried out 
by Robert Gilpin (1987) and Paul Kennedy (1987) in the 1980s, as well as the neo-realist 
theoretical approaches of the 1990s (Krauthammer, 1991; Kissinger, 1994; Hungtington, 
1999) stand out. This research strand was further strengthened at the beginning of the 
21st century (Amsden, 2001; O’Neil, 2001; Haas, 2008; Khana, 2008; Zakaria, 2009; 
Ikenberry, Mastanduno y Wolforth, 2009 y Acharya y Buzan, 2009).  
The perspective of neoclassical realism2, in particular, is appropriate for this analysis 
insofar as this approach emphasizes the need to incorporate domestic variables into 
                                                     
1  The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e 
a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013, with the aim of 
publishing Janus.net. Text translated by Carolina Peralta. 
2  Within neoclassical realism, Gideon Rose distinguishes three successive lines of work. First, the studies of 
Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy and Michael Mandelbaum, in the early eighties. Second, the research of Aaron 
Friedberg and Melvyn Lefflerin the late eighties and early nineties. Finally, the actual neoclassical authors 
such as Fareed Zakaria, William Curti Wohlforth, Thomas Christensen and Randall Schweller (Rose, 1998: 
155-156). 
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international analyses in order to have a better understanding of the policies conducted 
by state actors in the international arena (Rose, 1998: 147). Consequently, it is important 
to ask: in what proportion do the internal and external factors that explain the future of 
a given State condition its position in the global arrangement? Taking into account the 
case of Brazil: what are the consequences – of both its achievements and its recent 
troubles - for its international trajectory? 
As a starting point for the analysis, it is argued that the combination of material capacities 
and influential resources allows explaining the situation of a given State in the world 
order, particularly from a political and economic point of view3.  
With regard to Brazil’s case, the argument is based on the idea that the government of 
Lula da Silva's Workers’ Party (PT) joined this international game, from 2003 onwards, 
with strong intentions to climb up all ladders as they came about, underpinned by a 
serious, committed and ambitious domestic and external policy. However, as the years 
went by, mesmerized by a favourable international economic situation and a global 
environment that only seemed to praise the achievements of this Latin American country, 
the Brazilian government abandoned the path of effort. Thus, it settled for a comfortable 
economic policy that encouraged the reprimarization of the country, alongside a stance 
that endorsed, or at least pretended to ignore, an increasingly corrupt government 
behaviour (in association with private actors). As a result, PT governments, particularly 
after the administration of Dilma Rousseff, started losing the support of the majority of 
Brazilian society. In addition, pressures exerted from abroad - particularly by 
transnational investment groups and the world press - added to the withdrawal of support 
for the Brazilian political class, further aggravating the national crisis. 
This work is based on a qualitative methodology with a high descriptive and analytical 
content, emphasizing the sequence of events linked to Brazil’s case4. The time period 
chosen includes the three PT governments (two mandates of Lula da Silva and one of 
Dilma Rousseff) as well as the period encompassing Michel Temer’s administration until 
today. 
This article goes through the different ladders that the Brazilian government successfully 
climbed during the first decade of this century. Then, it examines each one of the snakes 
the country has met with along the way, starting in the second decade. Finally, it seeks 
to identify on what foundations Brazil can still sustain itself in order to rebuild itself and 
return to the game with new ladders that enable its long-awaited emergence. 
 
2. Ladders: the PT government during the first decade of the 21st 
century 
During the first decade of the new century, hand in hand with the administration of Lula 
da Silva, Brazil commendably climbed up multiple ladders: sustained economic growth, 
social growth by means of the expansion of the middle classes, great international 
diplomatic activism, diversification of partners and implementation of what could be 
called a "showcase operation" tending to highlight the country worldwide. 
Several analysts have identified this first stage as a bonanza period for the country 
(Rolland and Lessa 2010, Cervo and Bueno 2011, Cornelet, 2014, Cervo and Lessa, 
2014). In effect, long-term economic growth also meant political stability. In the 
2003-2010 period, Brazil had an average GDP annual growth of 4%. By the end of 2011, 
                                                     
3  It is important to clarify that strategic-military variables are not taken into account since they exceed the 
objectives set out in this work. 
4  To to this, qualitative content analysis of documents was conducted (specialized bibliography on the 
monitoring of Brazilian policies, as well as official documentation of national and international organizations) 
and analysis of quantitative data. 
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it had become the sixth economy in the world, pushing Great Britain to seventh place 
(data from IBGE, 2011). 
Regarding foreign trade, between 2003 and 2011 exports increased by 17%, surpassing 
the expansion of world trade (11.6%) (Cervo and Lessa, 2014:144). Likewise, a process 
of internationalization of Brazilian companies was conducted by means of growing 
incorporation into global productive chains (Actis, 2015).  
According to Pierre Salama (2010:3), "it would be wrong to argue that the economic 
policy followed by Lula was a continuity of that defined by Fernando Henrique Cardoso: 
orthodox in monetary terms (high interest rates) and fiscal (primary budget surplus). 
Although to some extent this is a founded explanation, it is simplistic. He adds that "Lula's 
policy, contrary to that of his predecessor, was aimed at achieving and accentuating the 
maintenance of demand levels based on the increase in the minimum wage and social 
transfers, the rise in public spending (after a tax reform) and credit facilities for 
consumption and production” (Salama, 2010:4). 
Accordingly, another of the ladders that Brazil managed to climb through the expansion 
of the middle classes becomes clear. Indeed, since 2003, the lower middle class or 
"class C" became the largest in the country with 91 million citizens thanks to the rise of 
27 million people who previously belonged to classes D and E. 
With a family income of between 600 and 2,600 dollars per month, class C represented 
37% of the Brazilian population in 2003, rising to 49% in 2008 (Getulio Vargas 
Foundation, 2010). According to data provided by the Institute of Applied Economic 
Research (IPEA) of Brasilia, for the first time in history the middle class exceeded half of 
the economically active population, standing at 51.84% of the population. This led to a 
marked reduction in poverty from 34.93% in 2002 to 25.16% in 2008 (IPEA, 
07/08/2008). It should be noted that the increase in average income especially benefited 
the population with fewer resources located in the Northeast of the country. 
It also started to be noticed that a good part of the new members of the lower middle 
class had more years of schooling, were more qualified and tended to sign formal work 
contracts (Sallum, 2008). It is important to bear in mind that many received a lot of 
government assistance through several ongoing social programmes, including the "Bolsa 
Família" (Family Allowance), the "“Hambre cero” (Zero Hunger) plan, as well as those 
linked to education such as ProUni, FIES and ReUni5. 
The described social policies also correlated in the external actions of the country. The 
principle "everyone is entitled to three meals a day", the moral basis of action in favour 
of the social inclusion of Brazilian citizens and the international inclusion of nations, 
implied a "multiplication of cooperation projects in the areas of agriculture, food, health 
and education sponsored both by the government and NGOs"(Cervo and Lessa, 
2014:134). 
In terms of foreign policy, a strategy of greater world visibility was developed, which was 
based on intense international activity through high-level multilateral and multi-
spatial diplomacy. The Lula da Silva government carried out a clearly proactive external 
action, which was demonstrated by the numerous trips and bilateral visits made by the 
Head of Government and his Minister of Foreign Relations Celso Amorim6, as well as by 
the country’s intense executive and technical participation in the most relevant world 
forums. 
                                                     
5  For additional information about the educational programmes see Sallum, 2008. 
6  In the period 2002-2010, the Brazilian president made 267 official visits to 83 countries around the world. 
Minister Celso Amorim, meanwhile, made 630 trips abroad and was received, at least once, in 106 states. 
In contrast, from 2003 to 2010, Brazil had the official visit of 281 heads of state and government from 108 
countries and hosted 260 meetings with foreign affairs ministers. In other words, Lula da Silva received 
foreign officials on its territory an average of once a week (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, 2011). 
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In fact, the government of Lula da Silva created and was the driving force behind multiple 
events for regional and global negotiation, such as UNASUR and CELAC in Latin America, 
and the Africa-South America (ASA) and South America-Arab Countries (ASPA) Summits. 
It was also actively present at global multilateral meetings held within the framework of 
the United Nations, the WTO, WHO, FAO and the COPs on Climate Change, among others, 
generating the creation of various pressure groups in defence of their interests. (G20 
Agriculture Ministerial Meeting, BASIC). It was also one of the main promoters for the 
creation of forums composed of exclusively emerging powers such as IBSA or the BRICS. 
The government also sought the inclusion of Brazil in meetings traditionally attended only 
by the developed powers, such as the G7, in which the Brazilian State participated on 
several occasions as a special guest. Finally, the Brazilian government sought to 
demonstrate the regional and international importance of its country, promoting high-
level political dialogues with the main traditional powers, that is, the United States and 
Europe7. In short, the government consolidated Brazil as a pole of regional power in 
South America and at the same time transformed it into a State with a relevant global 
insertion. 
Within this same line of goals at international level, the TP government actively 
diversified its commercial partners. From this perspective, the Lula government 
encouraged the opening of new markets to include other developing countries in the 
external trade system. 
As a result, while in 2002 Brazilian exports to non-OECD countries reached 38.5% of the 
total, in 2009 this amount rose to 57% (Amorim, 2010: 216). In this regard, Vigevani 
and Cepaluni (2007: 304) argue that the government of Lula da Silva encouraged the 
quest for autonomy by means of diversification, that is, both the partners and the 
strategic options of the country multiplied in order to achieve a better balance with the 
countries of the North. 
Finally, the Brazilian government climbed the ladder of national and international 
greatness with the implementation of a "showcasing operation" to highlight the 
country worldwide, which earned it all kinds of praise, establishing a positive image of 
Brazil globally.  
In this context, the "BRIC" concept acquired growing prominence in both the media and 
audiences in general, when they trumpeted the emergence of new powers that would 
replace existing ones. The "staging" of Brazil as one of the four global promises for the 
next fifty years - based on its economic potential - was the kick-start for the development 
of a Brazilian foreign policy increasingly shaped by global communication variables, that 
is, by the consideration of the "international community's gaze" and of the "national 
image" itself. From this perspective, it is worth mentioning the presence of a strong 
presidential figure, by means of which Lula da Silva placed himself at the centre of the 
national and world political scene8. In addition, the Brazilian government maintained a 
flowing communication with the national media in order to maintain good relations that 
would result in a higher popularity level for Lula (Breve, 2009). In the same way, Lula 
had an excellent degree of acceptance by the world press (BBC World, 31/12/2009). 
Therefore, the good opinion of Lula was replicated in the international image of Brazil, 
turning the country into a true centre of global attention.  
                                                     
7  In effect, the Brazilian government maintains a Global Partnership Dialogue with the United States, at 
ministerial level, and the European Union-Brazil Summits that began in 2007. Both are held annually 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, 2011: 30-33) 
8  Having won the elections in the second round with 61.3% of the votes, he became the most voted president 
in the history of Brazil. For the 2006 elections, he won again in the second round with 60.82% of the votes, 
maintaining the support of the Brazilian people. Towards the end of his second term, Lula continued to have 
an 80% of positive image according to several Brazilian surveys. 
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It is also worth mentioning the publication made by The Economist (12/11/2009), entitled 
“Brazil takes off”, which can be considered the corollary of all this recognition stage of 
Brazil by the media and international think-tanks. 
Finally, the "showcasing operation" also involved the establishment of Brazil as a venue 
for mega events organized by civil society - social, environmental, sports - among which 
the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Rio de Janeiro 
stand out. 
 
3. Snakes: Brazil from the second decade of the new century onwards  
At the beginning of the second decade of the new century, the international scene as a 
whole began to show certain cracks. As mentioned above, the 2008 economic crisis that 
hit the developed nations strongly seemed, at first, not to affect the so-called emerging 
powers. In this sense, Brazil managed to stay out of these avatars but only for a short 
period of time. A series of domestic difficulties became increasingly present, dragging 
Brazil towards multiple "snakes": economic slowdown that later became a recession with 
major social setbacks, corruption, political-institutional crisis, reprimarization of the 
economy, decrease in multilateral diplomatic activism and finally what might be called 
the "international shame" effect. 
Regarding the economic slowdown, according to World Bank data, the average annual 
growth of the BRIC economies was reduced by half in 2015, compared to 2010: “Average 
growth among this group has slowed from an average of 9 percent in 2010 to about 4 
percent in 2015” (World Bank, 08/01/2016). Likewise, the growth of Brazil was slower 
than that of the rest of its acronym partners. 
The lack of ability of Dilma Rousseff's cabinet to manage the crisis is one of the reasons 
that explain the deepening of the discomfort (Solano Gallego, 2016:147). The economy 
stagnated in 2014 and a recession began in 2015. In effect, "in 2016 the Brazilian 
economy was in a recession, with an estimated drop of 3.6% of the GDP, that is, a GDP 
reduction of more than 3.5% for the second year in a row". The total net public debt, on 
the other hand, "went up from 36.2% of the GDP at the end of 2015 to 44.2% of the 
GDP as of October 2016". Likewise, the lower economic activity had a strong impact on 
the tax collection of the federal, state, and municipal governments. The recession of the 
industry was maintained for the twelfth consecutive quarter in 2016, which continued to 
be reflected in a drop in its product, especially in the processing and construction industry 
(CEPAL, 2016:1-3). 
The situation also led to significant social setbacks. Brazil is currently experiencing a 
situation of rising unemployment, a high rate of inflation in food prices and a decrease in 
the real income of workers. According to data provided by ECLAC, "the unemployment 
rate rose from 6.8% in September 2014 to 8.9% in September 2015 and to 11.8% in 
the same month of 2016. In the first ten months of 2016, 751,000 formal jobs were lost, 
representing a fall of 4.2% in total jobs". As for the real average wage, there was "a 
decrease of 2.4% in 12 months up to October 2016". Inflation reached a peak of 10.7% 
at the end of 2015, falling to 7.9 in October 2016. However, food prices maintained their 
upward trend, with an increase of 4% (from 12% in 2015 to 12.4% in 2016) (ECLAC, 
2016: 4). 
It should also be mentioned that since Temer took power, the agenda of social problems 
has been exacerbated by legislative projects that limit public spending and seek the 
reform of labour or retirement laws, aggravating an already discouraging panorama 
(Solano Gallego, 2016: 154). 
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The second snake that entrapped Brazil and that seems not to end is corruption. In 
2013, the so-called "Lava Jato"9 operation, that is, a corruption investigation into the 
procedures carried out by the state-owned company Petrobras was unleashed. According 
to Tible and Moraes (2015: 7), this investigation "reveals with greater clarity the explicit 
and spurious links between the political and economic worlds.” In effect, this first 
operation, as well as other investigations derived from it, exposed a network of corruption 
that involves both businessmen and various Brazilian politicians. Regarding the latter, it 
should be noted that, although at first the judicial process included several members of 
the Workers' Party (PT) in a leading role, "today we know that Petrobras' corruption 
scheme also involved the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the Brazilian 
Social Democracy Party (PSDB)" (Solano Gallego, 2015: 149). 
The motivations that make it possible to explain the spread and deepening of acts of 
corruption in Brazil in recent years (both regarding the amounts of money involved and 
the number of members of the political and economic elite included in the scandal) refer 
to three main issues. Firstly, the request for bribes in the public works tenders, as 
demonstrated in the case of Petrobras. Secondly, electoral financing by highly 
concentrated private contributions, which encouraged an increase in corruption. In this 
sense, Marcelo Odebrecht, condemned to 19 years’ imprisonment, declared before the 
Brazilian justice that "75% of the electoral campaigns were financed by means of 
undeclared payments. The businessman involved 12 of the 27 governors of the country 
and the five former Brazilian presidents alive (Infobae, 04/15/2017). Finally, the creation 
of political coalitions that guarantee the governability of the country has also been based 
on acts of corruption. In this regard, Brandon Van Dyck (2016: 19) wrote with irony: "in 
the multiparty presidential systems of Latin America, governability depends on the 
formation of legislative coalitions, and in the past two decades, Brazil has done better 
than almost all the countries of Latin America. Now it should do it cleanly". From this 
perspective, Cervo and Lessa (2014: 135) argue that: "the political system of party 
coalition easily displaces the governability of efficiency in favour of individual or party 
advantage".  
It is pertinent to mention that the judicial investigations conducted did not stop 
generating controversy, especially due to certain legal abuses and because of the political 
selectivity shown at the beginning, insofar as they focused on PT officials with direct and 
clear negative repercussions on the initiated, simultaneously, against Dilma Rousseff in 
2016.  
However, in March 2017 the Brazilian justice requested the opening of 83 proceedings 
against politicians, an initiative that reached the leadership of the three main political 
parties in the country. The list contains a host of senior or former prominent individuals, 
including: Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (PT); six ministers of Temer’s current 
government; the last two presidential candidates of the opposition, Aécio Neves and José 
Serra; and the presidents of Congress10 and of the Senate. The prosecution has also 
expanded the investigation to two more government ministers and former President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The inquiries also extend to 29 senators, at least 40 
deputies and three governors "(newspaper El País, 04/13/2017). 
This list gives an account of the snake that threatens Brazil and which is linked to a deep 
political institutional crisis. In fact, the aforementioned economic and corruption 
problems went hand in hand with a series of social protests that started this crisis. The 
                                                     
9  Petrobras tendered its works to large engineering and construction companies in Brazil, as part of a 
programme encouraged by President Lula to stimulate the creation of jobs in the country. In order to favour 
the hiring of certain companies, the Brazilian oil company requested bribes that were around 3% of the 
budget, which were distributed among politicians and businessmen. The money was reintroduced in the 
system through hotel, laundries and gas stations businesses to be laundered. Then it was transferred abroad 
through "front" companies to accounts in China or Hong Kong (newspaper El País, 04/03/2016). 
10  The president of the Chamber of Deputies was Eduardo Cunha, architect of the impeachment against 
Rousseff, and who also ended up being dismissed and detained. 
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first wave of demonstrations occurred in June 2013, beginning in São Paulo and 
extending to other Brazilian locations. The protest was mainly carried out by the lower 
middle classes and was motivated, at first, by the increase in the cost of public transport. 
However, other claims quickly joined in, among which the people’s rejection of the 
priorities of state spending, the recurrent acts of corruption and the manner in which 
public resources were being used. In this regard, the organization of the World Cup was 
strongly criticized given the exorbitant sums of money involved and the persistence of 
highly unsatisfactory public services throughout the country. It should be noted that, at 
that time, there were no claims due to socioeconomic shortcomings, as, according to the 
surveys of that time, the majority of the population (71%) admitted being satisfied with 
their standard of living and 43% had positive expectations about the future of the country 
(Ibope Institute survey in Infobae, 23/06/2013). That is to say, the main motivation for 
the protest was greater demands in terms of health, education and infrastructure, despite 
the fact that the economic situation of the majority of citizens had not yet been affected. 
The second wave of protests took place in 2015 and, unlike the previous ones, it was 
mostly carried out by the middle and high classes, whites and middle or old age, who 
demanded the fight against corruption and the departure of Dilma Rousseff from the 
government (Tible and Moraes, 2015:4). In this way, the problems associated with the 
increasingly unconcealed vices of national politics acquired total public preponderance. 
In spite of this, the growing dissatisfaction of large sectors of the Brazilian population - 
irrespective of the region, age or level of income - who had begun to suffer from a 
national socio-economic reality in clear regression should not be ignored. Consequently, 
the popularity of President Dilma Rousseff collapsed: "If at the end of the second Lula 
government nine out of ten Brazilians approved his management, by 2015 an inverse 
phenomenon was manifested: only one in ten trusted his successor in the Planalto" (Tible 
and Moraes, 2015: 6). 
This situation led to the beginning of a political crisis in which the majority of Brazilian 
society manifests almost total lack of representativeness of the executive and legislative 
powers and politicians in general, a fact that, in turn, deepened the weakening of the PT 
as a ruling political party. 
At the same time, in the Congress alliances began to weaken. Indeed, "allied" parties 
that led certain ministries began to vote against the national government of the PT in the 
parliamentary sessions. Faced with this, the political articulation was placed in the hands 
of Vice President Michel Temer of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB)11 
who had been the PT's main ally at federal level but ended up becoming the largest 
opposition party heading the political trial of Dilma Rousseff12. 
The reported events caused serious governability difficulties and situations of political 
instability to this day - with new and scandalous accusations against the current President 
Temer, who has virtually no level of public support. The situation exposes the deep 
institutional crisis that involves all the most important political parties in Brazil. 
On the other hand, the Brazilian state faces a fourth snake, which some specialists 
identify as the "deindustrialization" of the country that has as a correlate the 
"reprimarization" of the national economy (Cypher, 2009; Malamud, 2011; Salama, 
2014; Cervo and Lessa, 2014; Hearn, 2015; Brun, 2016; Svampa, 2013, 2017). It is 
important to consider that this process exceeds the Brazilian case. Indeed, during the 
first decade of 2000, Latin America experienced strong growth due to a boom in the 
                                                     
11  The PMDB is a party without a clear programme. The party's strategy since the re-democratization of the 
country has been to stay on the side of power but without presenting candidates, taking advantage of the 
Brazilian electoral system, which practically prevents the winning parties from winning the parliamentary 
majority and forces them to look for allies (Solano Gallego, 2016: 155). 
12  In 2016, Dilma Rousseff was subjected to an impeachment process, in which fiscal irregularities were 
alleged. It lasted for eight months and culminated with the dismissal of the president.  
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prices of primary goods. The robust global demand for these products driven by the high 
growth rates of Asian nations was a unique opportunity for the region’s economies. 
In this context, in 2009 China became Brazil’s first commercial partner, surpassing the 
historical position of the United States13. In the last decade, Brazil has exported mainly 
highly concentrated raw materials and imported goods from the industrial sector, more 
diversified and with a tendency to greater added value. As an example, between January 
and April 2016, soy represented 51.3% of Brazilian exports to China 
(Brun, 2016:202). Consequently, Brazil’s global export basket has been primarized, with 
a greater participation of basic products to the detriment of the manufacturing sector. 
Furthermore, "by competing with Brazilian products in domestic and regional markets, 
mainly in South America and the United States, China would also provoke the de-
industrialization of the Brazilian economy, as well as its inability to move towards the 
production of higher-tech goods”14 (Brun, 2016:202). As a result, the Brazilian economy 
in recent years has been characterized by low innovation and low competitiveness of 
production and service systems, with the exception of the agribusiness (Cervo and Lessa, 
2014:135). 
Faced with this process, the Rousseff’s government remained inert so that due to the 
"end of the super cycle of commodities" (Svampa, 2017), associated with the slowdown 
of growth in China, the consequences for the national economy have been critical. 
In the words of Adrián Hearn (2015: 63), "The current negative perceptions about China 
contrast with the initial enthusiasm aroused by Chinese funding during the tour of Latin 
America in 2004 by the then president Hu Jintao among politicians and industry leaders". 
Between 2005 and 2013, "Brazil received 31,400 million dollars of Chinese investment, 
becoming the fourth largest investment destination of the Asian giant after the US, 
Australia and Canada" (Hearn, 2015:63). 
In sum, Brazilian economy’s excessive dependence on agriculture has meant a setback 
in the value chain, which continues to be mainly based on exports of unprocessed soya. 
From a foreign policy perspective, the next snake Brazil faced was a decrease in 
international diplomatic activism, once the hallmark of the government during the 
Lula da Silva years. It is important to clarify that both the style of President Dilma - with 
a lower charismatic profile than Lula - and the beginning of a much more complex 
economic situation after the financial crisis of 2008 led the new government to focus 
more on internal affairs. The international prominence of Brazil was then slightly 
diminished by the Rousseff government. Thus, "a large presence of Brazil in traditional 
multilateral organisms, global or regional, is maintained, mostly by the diplomatic 
machine, Itamaraty” (Cervo y Lessa, 2014:136). 
The events that took place after the impeachment process against the president further 
exacerbated this situation, since all political views focused on domestic problems. 
Therefore, the Brazilian foreign policy left aside the motorization of multilateral 
negotiation instances. Within the framework of the emerging powers, in particular, Brazil 
relinquished its role as a catalyst for the agenda both within IBSA, which entered a stage 
of hibernation, and as part of the BRIC countries, where it was replaced by Putin's 
government as the main driver of initiatives within the group and, later, also by China, 
which, since the arrival of Xi Jinping, began to adopt a higher international profile. 
In spite of what has been said, it is important not to forget that the systemic conditions 
of the international arena have also changed. In this sense, the erosion of the WTO as a 
result of the start of certain bilateral negotiations (the TTP and the TTIP), Britain’s exit 
                                                     
13  The trade exchanges between Brazil and China soared since the beginning of the 2000s, reaching 46 billion 
US dollars of exports (Brun, 2016:201). 
14  In fact, cell phones, footwear, clothes and motorcycles are the sectors that lost most ground before China 
in the export markets (Jenkins, Barbosa, 2012: 78 in Brun, 2016:202). 
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of the European Union and the arrival of Donald Trump to the United States government 
formed a more complex and unpredictable international scenario which, therefore, added 
to the internal developments in Brazil. 
With the arrival of Michel Temer, the great strategies of Lula are still maintained but 
through a reactive or follow-up foreign policy. As an example, Brazil continues to 
participate in the BRIC summits. Since Dilma was removed from power, the Chancellery 
became a space of power of the PSDB, which resulted in José Serra becoming a minister, 
who, in turn was, subsequently replaced by Aloysio Nunes, currently in office. From there, 
an attempt has been made to grant the country's foreign policy a more economic tone, 
in which negotiations with the old continent for the signing of a Mercosur-European Union 
agreement have become one of the state priorities (Cárdenas, 2016). 
It should also be noted that the cuts in public spending implemented by Temer’s new 
government have also involved the country’s diplomatic machinery. In this sense, the 
closure of embassies in places considered "non-priority", such as Africa, was announced, 
in clear contrast to the policies implemented by Lula in the previous decade in relation to 
that continent (Vásquez, 2016:22). 
Finally, Brazil has been entangled in recent years, especially since the events that led to 
Rousseff’s impeachment, in the snake of "international shame." Indeed, from the 
perspective of state governments, particularly in terms of foreign policymakers, the 
international recognition and prestige aspirations have had as their correlate an 
irrepressible fear of shame and global humiliation. In Brazil’s case, the last years of the 
PT government seemed to demonstrate a State that was more concerned with 
"managing" the country's international reputation than with addressing the real national 
needs15. 
The fear of international disgrace is a novel element in world politics, and typical of a 
global interconnected and televised system, which especially affects the emerging powers 
in their eagerness to demonstrate that they are in a position to belong to the big leagues. 
As a result, the international image of Brazil has also suffered a severe setback due to 
the endemic corruption that has been unveiled but also as a consequence of a media 
campaign that was carried out from abroad and that appeared to aim the end of the 
government of Dilma Rousseff. Mónica Hirst (05/05/2016) states that there was pressure 
from abroad, "with clear messages in favour of the rapid exit of the PT government in 
Brazil”. The report of The Economist (03/26/2016) entitled "Time to go" was illustrative 
in this regard. 
She also adds that "the opinions of Latin American political leaders identified with their 
opposition counterparts in Brazil who defended the resignation of the president were 
frequent in the regional press". The truth is that since the beginning of the impeachment 
process against Rousseff, Brazil has been the setting of a series of intra-hegemonic 
disputes among the political-economic alliances (both national and international) that 
govern the country and that apparently have not yet been resolved. 
Brazil's reputation has not improved to date, as different political and institutional 
scandals continue to appear. In this sense, only the holding of new presidential elections 
(scheduled for October 2018) can calm the waters to restart the way. 
 
4. Final considerations  
It is well known that in the traditional Hindu game, the number of ladders is lower than 
the number of snakes, reminding us that the paths of good are more difficult to travel 
than the ways of evil. Going back to the initial question posed in this article, it is worth 
                                                     
15  This topic is further deepened in Giaccaglia, Clarisa (2014)"Poderes emergentes: ¿todo es sólo para la foto? 
El caso de Brasil", in revista Estudos Internacionais of PUC Minais, Belo Horizonte (MG), Vol. 2, no.1. 
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
e-ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 9, Nº. 1 (May-October 2018), pp. 155-169  
Brazil: ladders and snakes 
Clarisa Giaccaglia 
 165 
 
asking again: What are the ladders that the Brazilian government succeeded to climb 
and stay in that position? How much progress was made during this "window of 
opportunity" that currently seems to be closing? 
As pointed out throughout this paper, the positioning of a given State in the global order 
depends on the combination of a series of internal and international factors. 
From a domestic affairs perspective, the outcome of another political scandal around 
Michel Temer in 2017 has brought about new threats about Brazil’s chances of 
overcoming the economic recession that it has suffered for two years. The truth is that 
the country has the structural conditions to overcome the present economic difficulties, 
so the uncertainty lies, in any case, in the time this recovery will require, given, above 
all, the resolution of the political crisis. 
It is important to remember that despite the turbulent episodes the country is going 
through, democracy has not been questioned. The political parties, still very discredited, 
continue to act. Brazilian society, for its part, has shown growing and unprecedented 
levels of participation and has begun to ask for explanations from the main political and 
economic elites for their illicit acts. 
In fact, one of the greatest strengths of Brazil lies in having achieved the inclusion, during 
the last decade, of millions of people into the country's middle class. Consequently, this 
social rise is what has led to the various civil protests, a recent event in the country's 
political history taking into account that Brazilians have discovered the possibility of 
demanding. Until then, "those who were born poor died poor. That started to change, 
and maybe it is one of the biggest social changes we have had in Brazil since the end of 
slavery in the 19th century” (Schmitt en Duffy, 18/09/2007). In addition, and despite 
the fact that the socioeconomic situation is unfavourable, poverty and inequality continue 
well below the levels of the 1990s. According to data provided by the World Bank (2017), 
the Gini index in Brazil went from 60.5 in 1990 to 51.48 in 2014.  
In short, as noted by Tible and Moraes (2015: 14), in the last decades in Brazil, three 
important macro debates were won: democracy (end of the dictatorship), fighting 
inequalities (since the Lula da Silva administration) and political distribution (since the 
first protests in June 2013 that opened the citizens’ demands). 
However, a retrospective look requires that we also consider everything that needs to be 
reformulated if Brazil wishes to continue the path begun in recent years. In this sense, 
two issues are unavoidable. From an economic point of view, the primarization of the 
economy and, therefore, deindustrialization, are problems that must be seriously 
addressed by future governments to avoid that an excessive dependency of the 
international trade on agricultural products conditions the model of national 
development. Similarly, the social inclusion attained must go beyond the mere inclusion 
by "consumption”, that is, based on an increase in purchasing power and include better 
access to education, health and infrastructure, as currently claimed by Brazilian society. 
From a political point of view, a revision of the actions of the so-called progressive 
governments is required, which includes Brazil but also involves all of South America. In 
this sense, Maristella Svampa (2017: 63-64) affirms that the current conservative turn 
in the region is linked, to a large extent, "to the limitations, mutations and disproportions 
of the progressive governments". From a critical perspective, she argues that "Certainly, 
at the beginning of the cycle, all progressive movements involved enhancing a language 
of rights (social, collective, economic, and cultural) and opened a window for different 
democratization policies. But between 2000 and 2016, a lot of water ran under the 
bridge". In this sense, she adds that it is not the same to talk about "new Latin American 
left" and "populism of the 21st century": "in the passage from one characterization to 
another, something important was lost on the way, something that evokes the evolution 
towards models of traditional domination, based on the cult of the leader, his 
identification with the State and the search or aspiration to perpetuate himself in power". 
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Coinciding with this need for self-criticism, it is also pertinent to recall the words of 
another progressive Latin American, such as former Uruguayan President José Mujica: "if 
the left looses ground, then let it lose it and learn from it" (newspaper La Nación, 
19/03/2016). 
Therefore, returning to the path of national industrialization and improving bureaucratic 
mechanisms in pursuit of greater political transparency appear as two of the main goals 
to be taken into account by the Brazilian government for the next decade. 
Regarding international factors, two aspects should be mentioned. With regard to Brazil’s 
foreign policy, it is foreseen that the protagonism achieved in recent years will continue 
to take into account the transformation of Brazil into a State with global interests. The 
changes will then be based on the nuances that this role will adopt based on the systemic 
changes that have taken place - lack of recovery of world trade levels to the pre-2008 
stage, Brexit, the arrival of Donald Trump to the executive power of the United States -, 
among the most significant. As a result, there seems to be an international role for Brazil, 
which will be still active but with lower levels of revisionism and, therefore, with a more 
status-quoist stance, also claiming the benefits of a diversification of partners that allows 
both good relations with the United States and the consolidation of links with the BRIC 
countries, especially with China. 
A second aspect refers to the reorganization of political-economic alliances (both national 
and international) that govern the country. In a broad sense, it is appropriate to resort 
to the arguments of Ian Taylor (2006: 37), who assures that the appearance of the BRICs 
was an attempt on the part of the transnational financial capital - with the active help of 
the very elites of the BRIC countries - to promote the hegemony of liberal capitalism 
through the incorporation of emerging powers into the world order, so that they become 
new centres of accumulation and growth within the existing system. 
However, the dynamics of the current global capitalism has shown that, for a growth 
model based on the expansion of the middle classes on the basis of consumption to 
continue, "another planet would be necessary" (Friedman, 10/03/2012). Therefore, the 
awareness that the distribution of dividends worldwide cannot be infinite, (particularly 
following the 2008 crisis which has still not been overcome) has provoked a series of 
intra-hegemonic disputes within the framework of transnational political-economic 
alliances. The Brazilian case must then be understood in that context: the crisis affecting 
the country involves the internal political and business sectors but also the global media 
and transnational financial actors have actively intervened.  
The rearrangement of these alliances will therefore condition the future of the world 
system as well as the possibility that the South American giant may continue to advance 
up the ladders of the new international game in the coming decades. So that the "kama" 
(desire) stands higher on the "karma" (destiny) of Brazil.  
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